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I. INTRODUCTION

Albert Einstein's name has become synonymous with genius, and even he
once posited, "[t]he hardest thing in the world to understand is the income
tax."' The complexity and confusion caused by the Internal Revenue Code
("IRC") are contributing factors to why more than half of taxpayers use a
paid tax preparer to file each year.2 Most Americans simply want to ensure
* Articles Editor, American University Business Law Review; J.D., American University
Washington College of Law, 2018; B.A. Economics and Politics, Brandeis University,
2013. I would like to thank the American University Business Law Review staff for their
remarkable work and help in preparing this Note for publication and my family and
friends for their tremendous support throughout the process. Special thanks to Hilary
Rosenthal and Nathan Roy for their guidance on this piece.
1. Tax Quotes, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/tax-quotes (last updated Aug.
21, 2018).
2. See Written Testimony of John A. Koskinen Commissioner Internal Revenue
Service Before the S. Fin. Comm. on Regulation of Tax Return Preparers, 113th Cong.
1 (2014) [hereinafter Koskinen Testimony] (testifying to the Senate Finance Committee,
former IRS Commissioner, John A. Koskinen explained that fifty-six percent of
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that everything on their tax return is correct.3 For this reason, it is highly
concerning that taxpayers may not be able to trust the tax preparer they are
paying to do their taxes.
Over the past two decades, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") has tried
to increase oversight of tax return preparers; however, various lawsuits have
prevented the agency from doing so. 4 Numerous investigations have
demonstrated that non-credentialed return preparers ("NCRPs") consistently
prepare returns incorrectly, thereby resulting in widespread underreporting
of income.' This Note will examine the impact of tax preparer misconduct
through the lens of certain refundable and non-refundable credits. 6 This Note
focuses on that particular population because taxpayers claiming those
credits are more likely to use paid tax preparers, specifically NCRPs, than
their counterparts, who are not claiming those credits,7 and because
incorrectly claiming these credits can significantly impact the financial
wellbeing and future eligibility of these taxpayers who trust someone to
make sure they are in compliance.' This Note should not be seen as a
taxpayers used paid preparers, and ninety percent of Americans seek some form of
assistance on their taxes).
3. See 2014 Taxpayer Attitude Survey, IRS OVERSIGHT BOARD 1, 8 (Dec. 2014),
https://www.treasury.gov/IRSOB/reports/Documents/IRSOB%/`20Taxpayer%/`20Attitud
e%20Survey%202014.pdf (explaining that, contrary to conventional wisdom, taxpayers
are more motivated to pay their taxes because of personal integrity than because of fear
or third-party pressure).
4. See Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013, 1014-15 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (ruling that the IRS
does not have the authority to regulate an estimated 600,000 to 700,000 return preparers,
allowing them to continue working without training or credentials); see also Steele v.
United States, 260 F. Supp. 3d 52, 67-68 (D.D.C. 2017) (ruling that the IRS does have
the authority to require PTINs, but the IRS cannot charge a fee for acquiring or
maintaining a PTIN and must refund the previously paid fees).
5. See PURPLE BOOK: COMPILATION OF LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS TO
STRENGTHEN TAXPAYER RIGHTS AND IMPROVE TAX ADMINISTRATION, NAT'L TAXPAYER
ADVOC. 14-15 (Dec. 31 2017) [hereinafter PURPLE BOOK], https://taxpayeradvocate.

irs.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2017-ARC/ARC17_PurpleBook.pdf (citing studies
performed by the Government Accountability Office ("GAO"), Treasurer Inspector
General for Tax Administration ("TIGTA"), New York State Department of Taxation
and Finance, and the IRS which found extremely high instances of negligence and fraud
amongst paid tax preparers).
6. See infra Part II (looking specifically at the Earned Income Tax Credit ("EITC"),
refundable and nonrefundable child tax credit, and the refundable and nonrefundable
education credits).
7. See Rosemary Marcuss et al., ComplianceEstimatesfor the EarnedIncome Tax
Credit Claimedon 2006-2008 Returns, IRS 24 (Aug. 2014), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irssoi/EITCComplianceStudyTY2006-2008.pdf (contrasting the types of preparers used by
claimants and non-claimants and highlighting that forty-four percent of non-claimants
use a CPA, while only ten percent of claimants do).
8. See 26 U.S.C. § 32(k) (2018) (stating that taxpayers making "fraudulent or
reckless claims" can be disallowed from claiming the credit for two or ten years
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criticism of the aforementioned credits, but, rather, as an invitation to discuss
the lack of training and oversight of NCRPs and the impact of untrained and
unregulated NCRPs on taxpayers and the federal government's bottom line.9
With the passage of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act ("Act"), it is important that
preparers get the training and oversight needed to help these taxpayers
understand the changes in the law.'o While the expansion of the refundable
and non-refundable portions of the Child Tax Credit ("CTC") included in the
Act is intended to help families reduce their tax burden, expanding those
portions could incentivize preparer misconduct, thereby distorting the
purpose of the changes by hurting taxpayers who are misled by NCRPs."
Part II of this Note will examine the impact of underreporting on revenue
collection as well as the subsequent consequences for taxpayers, and, further,
Part II will analyze how some unqualified preparers exacerbate that problem.
Part III will discuss the strategies employed by the IRS to reduce noncompliance through stricter regulation on tax preparers. Part IV will assess
a variety of proposed legislative fixes and suggest ways to improve these

fixes.
II. MONEY LEFT ON THE TABLE AND HOW IT HURTS THE AMERICAN
TAXPAYER

A. Non-CredentialedPaidPreparersAre Adding to the Tax Gap
The United States ("U.S.") government is dependent on the voluntary
compliance of taxpayers for over ninety percent of the revenue it collects.12

depending on the circumstances).
9. See Policy Basics: The Child Tax Credit, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITY,
https://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/policy-basics-the-child-tax-credit
(last

updated Apr. 18, 2018) (explaining the positive impact that the CTC and ACTC have
had on reducing poverty and providing opportunities for children); see also Policy
Basics: The Earned Income Tax Credit, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITY, https://
www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/policy-basics-the-earned-income-tax-credit
(last
updated Apr. 19, 2018) (showing how the EITC encourages and rewards work and
reduces poverty).

10. See Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017) (starting
in tax year 2018, this law will make significant changes for all types of filers and will
require preparer awareness).

11. See 26 U.S.C. § 24(h) (increasing the upper income threshold to $400,000 for
joint returns and $200,000 for others, doubling the maximum credit to $2000 per child,
and increasing the refundable portion of the credit to $1,400 per child).
12.

See FISCAL YEAR 2016 HISTORICAL TABLES BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT,

OFF. MGMT. & BUDGET 38 (Feb. 2, 2015), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-

2016-TAB/pdf/BUDGET-2016-TAB.pdf

(estimating that for Fiscal Year

2017,

approximately 91.6 percent of revenue will come from individual income taxes (47.1
percent), payroll taxes (31.2 percent), and corporate income taxes (13.3 percent)).
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While most taxpayers are able to accurately file their taxes, there is a
significant difference between the amount of money owed and the amount
that is collected.' 3 The measure of this noncompliance is called the "gross
tax gap," and between 2008 and 2010, it amounted to an average of $458
billion per year.1 4 The "gross tax gap" not only represents money left on the
table, so-to-speak, it suggests that taxpayers who are not properly filing are
shifting their responsibility onto those who are.
The "gross tax gap" results from taxpayers underreporting, failing to file,
and underpaying, with underreporting comprising approximately 71.7% of
the gap.' 5 The largest share of underreporting from income tax return filers
comes from taxpayers filing business income reported on Schedules C, E,
and F,1 6 but this Note focuses on the second largest cause of underreporting:

credits. '7
By increasing the refundable portion of the CTC, Congress created a space
in which preparers could make errors affecting the gap and taxpayers." Said
increase in the potential refund raises the following question: are the same
underreporting problems facing the Earned Income Tax Credit ("EITC")
shared by the CTC?' 9
Errors in claiming the EITC accounts for approximately two-thirds of the
individual income tax underreporting gap attributable to credits, and between
2003 and 2013, EITC errors added $151 billion to the gap.20 In 2014, the
13. See TAX GAP
[hereinafter

Tax

ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2008-2010, IRS 1 (Apr. 2016)
Gap Estimates], https://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/tax%/`20gap%

20estimates%20for%202008%20through%202010.pdf

(explaining that over eighty-

three percent of taxpayers are compliant and overviewing the extent of the "tax gap"
through the lens of a study looking at tax years 2008-2010).
14. See id. (noting that the IRS estimates it will ultimately be able to collect $52
billion through administrative and enforcement activities making the "net tax gap" $406

billion).
15. See id. at 2 (estimating that underreporting represents $387 billion of the tax gap,
with non-filing and underpayment representing $32 billion and $39 billion respectively).
16. See id. at 19 (estimating that these taxpayers account for forty-seven percent of
the $319 billion-dollar gross tax gap for individual income tax).
17. See id. (approximating that fifteen percent of the individual income tax
underreporting tax gap comes from credits including the EITC (ten percent), refundable
and nonrefundable child tax credit (three percent), and the refundable and nonrefundable
education credits (two percent)).

18. See 26 U.S.C. § 24(h) (2018) (increasing the refundable portion of the CTC could
cause greater underreporting if it trends parallel to the way the EITC is treated).
19. See Koskinen Testimony, supra note 2, at 5 (testifying that underreporting for
claimants of the EITC can be partially attributed to the fact that approximately sixty
percent of EITC returns are prepared by paid preparers).
20. See Kyle Pomerleau, The EarnedIncome Tax CreditStill Faces HighErrorRate,
TAX FOUND. (Jan. 12, 2015), https://taxfoundation.org/eamed-income-tax-credit-stillfaces-high-error-rate/ (showing that the error rate of EITC returns hovered between
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IRS published a study on the filing habits of EITC claimants, identifying that
the claimants are far more likely to use paid preparers than non-claimants
and are also more likely to use unenrolled preparers or a preparer from a
national tax return preparation firm than non-claimants. 2' While some ofthe
underreporting for EITC claimants can be attributed to self-prepared returns,
as well as the complexity of the EITC requirements, it is undeniable that the
failures of certain paid preparers contribute significantly to the problem. 22
If the expansion of eligibility and the refundable nature of the CTC operate
like the EITC, increasing the refundable portion of the CTC will increase the
percentage of the tax gap attributable to underreporting credits irrespective
of errors potentially due to fraud or misunderstanding of the rules.
B. Impact on Taxpayers
The high rate of paid preparer error surrounding credits does not simply
affect the tax gap, it can lead to immediate and long-term issues for the most
vulnerable taxpayers. When a taxpayer incorrectly claims all or part of the
EITC, CTC, or American Opportunity Tax Credit ("AOTC"), the taxpayer
must pay back any amount in error with interest and may be subject to a
twenty percent accuracy-related penalty or a seventy-five percent fraud
penalty.23 In addition, if the IRS determines that error occurred from
"reckless or intentional disregard of rules and regulations" or fraud, the
taxpayer may be banned from claiming certain credits for two or ten years,
respectively.24 If the IRS determines that the error was not the result of
either, the taxpayer may yet carry the burden of filing an additional form to
claim the credit in subsequent years. 25 Because the Act broadens the
twenty-three and twenty-eight percent); see also Tax Gap Estimates, supra note 13
(approximating that the EITC is two thirds of the individual income tax underreporting
gap). But see Robert Greenstein et al., Reducing Overpayments in the Earned Income
Tax Credit, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL'Y PRIORITY, https://www.cbpp.org/research/federaltax/reducing-overpayments-in-the-eamed-income-tax-credit#_ftnref5 (last updated Feb.
20, 2018) (asserting that methodological problems may be inflating the rate of error for
EITC claimants).
21. See Marcuss et al., supra note 7, at 24.
22. See id. (showing that twenty-nine percent of EITC claimants self-prepare); see
also Greenstein et al., supra note 20 (highlighting the complexity of the EITC as a main
proponent of misfiling).
23. See Consequences of Not Meeting Your Due Diligence Requirements, IRS,
https://www.eitc.irs.gov/tax-preparer-toolkit/preparer-due-diligence/consequences-offailing-to-meet-your-due-diligence (last updated Sept. 28, 2017) (outlining the
consequences of incorrectly claiming certain credits).
24. 26 U.S.C. § 32(k) (2018).
25. See FORM 8862, INFORMATION TO CLAIM EARNED INCOME CREDIT, IRS,
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8862.pdf (last revised Oct. 2017) (requiring that the
taxpayer prove that they are in fact eligible for the credit they are claiming).
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eligibility and increases the credit amount for the CTC, a larger number of
people could be affected if their preparers are not accurately assisting in
preparing their tax returns.
III. THE IRS's EFFORTS TO FIX THE PREPARER PROBLEM

Just before the turn of the millennium, the IRS began issuing Preparer Tax
Identification Numbers ("PTINs") so that tax preparers would not have to
26
use their Social Security Numbers when preparing a return.6 A decade later,
recognizing the growing importance of oversight for third-party preparers,
IRS Commissioner Douglas Shulman created the Return Preparer Review,
with mandatory PTINs as the cornerstone.2 7 The resulting regulation
required that all paid preparers obtain a PTIN and renew it each year, pay
associated fees, pass a competency exam, and take fifteen continuing
education credits each year to stay abreast of changes; however, a group of
preparers sued the IRS, claiming that it did not have the statutory authority
to do so. 28
The IRS claimed to have the authority to regulate preparers through 31
U.S.C. section 330, which allows the Secretary of the Treasury to "regulate
the practice of representatives of persons before the Department of the
Treasury," but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in
Loving v. IRS,29 disagreed.3 0 The court determined that the IRS lacked
statutory authority to regulate tax preparers because preparers are not
"representatives" and do not "practice" before the department. 3 ' Ultimately,
the court disallowed all of the mandated testing and continuing education
requirements, leaving only the PTIN requirement and the associated fees. 3 2

26. See Press Release, IRS, IRS to Issue Alternative Identification Numbers for Tax

Preparers (Aug. 24, 1999), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/ir-99-72.pdf (providing
return preparers with an option to protect their Social Security Numbers from potential
abuse by their clients).
27. Return PreparerReview, IRS, 1-3 (Dec. 2009), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/p4832.pdf (outlining the commissioners plans to try to hold all preparers to the same
professional standards).

28. See Loving v. IRS, 742 F.3d 1013, 1014-15 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (finding that the
IRS only had the authority to require mandatory PTINs and charge for them but could
not impose any other requirements); see also Regulations Governing Practice Before the

Internal Revenue Service, 76 Fed. Reg. 32,286, 32,287 (June 3, 2011) (to be codified at
31 C.F.R. pt. 10).
29. 742 F.3d at 1015.
30. See 31 U.S.C. § 330 (2018); see also Loving, 742 F.3d at 1015.
31. See Loving, 742 F.3d at 1021-22 (stating that the IRS failed both Chevron,
US.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def Council steps because Congress had not spoken explicitly
on the issue and the actions of the IRS were arbitrary and capricious).
32. See generally id.

20 18

FAILING TO PREPARE

435

In its conclusion, the court recognized that this regulation may be "wise as a
policy matter," but it is one that would need a legislative solution.33
Additionally, preparers have since won a class action suit claiming that the
IRS has no authority to charge preparers for PTINs because preparers receive
no special benefit from the agency.3 4
Given the aforementioned decisions, the regulatory scheme has been
rendered toothless, as there are still no tests to ensure that preparers are
competent to do the job.35 The level of oversight granted to the IRS could
be hugely impactful on increasing tax compliance, as evidenced by
experimental programs on the state level.3 6 Before the IRS proposed the
PTIN program, the State of Oregon already regulated paid return preparers
under a similar regulatory scheme to the IRS's attempted fix in 2011, and the
state reduced its tax gap by $390 million.3 7 The State of California, which
maintains less stringent requirements for tax preparers, saw a decrease in
compliance with their program, demonstrating that a regulatory system
without teeth is not cost effective.38
Although it may make sense to emulate Oregon's regime on the national
level, the courts have been clear that the IRS does not have the authority to
do so. As such, Congress must resolve the problem. A legislative solution
is now more important than ever, not only because of the CTC's potential
effect on the tax gap and taxpayers, but because preparers need to be
educated on what is changing between Tax Years 2017 and 2018 due to the
Act.
IV. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS TO THE PREPARER PROBLEM

There have been legislative efforts in both the House and Senate to expand
the IRS's authority to establish competency standards for preparers in the
wake of a growing tax gap, but nothing has been put into law.3 9 In addition
33. Id. at 1022.
34. See Steele v. United States, 260 F. Supp. 3d 52, 67-68 (D.D.C. 2017) (leading to
an ongoing appeal and a court order estopping the IRS from continuing to charge for
PTINs in the interim).
35. See id. (requiring that preparers need only possess a PTIN to prepare a return).
36. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-781, TAX PREPARERS:
OREGON'S REGULATORY REGIME MAY LEAD TO IMPROVED FEDERAL TAX RETURN
ACCURACY AND PROVIDES A POSSIBLE MODEL FOR NATIONAL REGULATION (2008)

(showing that greater standards for NCRPs increased overall compliance).
37. See id. (attributing that the increase in compliance to the testing and education
requirements of tax preparers).
38. See id. (recognizing that Oregon had more stringent requirements and testing for
return preparers than California, with only fifty-four percent passing the state's basic
examination).

39. See Tax Return Preparer Competency Act of 2015, H.R. 4141, 114th Cong. § 2
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to these actions, the National Taxpayer Advocate ("NTA"), an independent
officer inside the IRS working on systemic issues affecting taxpayers, has
made the authorization of the IRS to establish minimum competency
standards one of her annual recommendations.4 0
The American Institute of CPAs ("AICPA") has expressed concern about
the expansion the IRS's authority to regulate tax preparers in the way that
these bills have proposed.4 ' One of the AICPA's main concerns is that
CPAs, and other credentialed preparers, will have the additional burden of
getting PTINs and will have to go through trainings and testing despite being
"highly-regulated and licensed at the state level." 4 2 Another concern
expressed by the AICPA is market confusion. 43 This concern is not a deal
breaker for the AICPA, but rather, the organization is asking that the IRS
have some sort of mitigating regulation that would require preparers with
this new level of certification to have a disclaimer that they are in fact
different from the already existing types of certified preparers. 44
The NTA responded to the AICPA's concerns in her report, asserting that
(2015) (adding language to 31 U.S.C. § 330 that would allow the IRS to create minimum
standards for preparers); Taxpayer Rights Act of 2015, H.R. 4128, 114th Cong. § 202
(2015) (mimicking language in the Tax Return Preparer Competency Act); see also
Description of the Chairman'sMark of a Bill to Prevent Identity Theft and Tax Refund
FraudBefore the S. Comm. on Fin., 114th Cong. 16-21 (2015) (outlining a plan requiring
third-party examination and continuing education for providers).
40. See PURPLE BOOK, supra note 5, at 14-16 (outlining the necessity for this change
and suggesting how it could be done).
41. See Letter from Troy K. Lewis, Chairman, AICPA Tax Exec. Comm., to the
Honorable Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Fin., and the Honorable Ron
Wyden, Ranking Member, Sen. Comm. on Fin. 6 (Sept. 15, 2015) [hereinafter AICPA
Letter to Senate], https://www.aicpa.org/Advocacy/Tax/DownloadableDocuments/
2015-09-15-Prevent-ID-Theft-and-Tax-Refund-Fraud-Comment-Letter-FINAL.pdf
(asking that Congress limit the PTIN requirement to preparers "not supervised by an
attorney, [CPA], or 'enrolled preparer"' and that the IRS take steps to limit market
confusion that may occur if any of these laws are passed); see also Letter from Troy K.
Lewis, Chairman, AICPA Tax Exec. Comm., to the Honorable Kevin Brady, Chairman,
Comm. on Ways & Means, and the Honorable Sander Levin, Ranking Member, Comm.
on Ways & Means 2 (Dec. 4, 2015) [hereinafter AICPA Letter to House],
https://www.aicpa.org/content/dam/aicpa/advocacy/tax/downloadabledocuments/201512-4-aicpa-comments-on-hr-4141-final.pdf (expressing concerns with H.R. 4141
because it may require CPAs and otherwise credentialed preparers to have the additional
burden of certifying with the IRS).
42. See AICPA Letter to House, supra note 41, at 2.
43. See id. (arguing that consumers would have difficulty understanding the
differences between otherwise credentialed preparers and this new class of "certified"
preparers and this would hurt CPAs' business and cause harm to taxpayers).
44. See AICPA Letter to Senate, supra note 41, at 6 (highlighting that the IRS
recognized the potential for market confusions "when they required the currently
unenrolled community be made subject to the guidance in Notice 2011-45, 2011-25 IRB
886 with regard to advertising restrictions").
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the AICPA's argument about market confusion is unconvincing, and,
regardless, the IRS "can and should" take the necessary steps to assure that
people are not confused about the varying levels of credentials. 45 The NTA
also ensured that the requirement of passing any tests or trainings would lie
solely on non-credentialed preparers.46
The AICPA also suggested that there is room in the proposed bills for
changes that could lead to more effective oversight, including granting the
IRS the authority to rescind a PTIN from a preparer that has been proven to
be preparing fraudulent tax returns.47 Another suggestion is that the IRS
could do more to exchange information about preparers with state
governments in order to "improve tax administration" in a way that could
reduce overall government expenditures.4 8
It does not seem that the AICPA, Congress, and the NTA have
irreconcilable views, especially considering all parties recognize the damage
done by underreporting. It seems that this decision will be one that depends
on political expediency. 49 The Act may be the political catalyst necessary
for this legislation to pass as Republicans are looking to ensure that it is
implemented smoothly.o Just as the Act may create a potential for an
increase in the tax gap, it has created an opportunity for bipartisan reform of
a problem that is plaguing tax administration."
V. CONCLUSION

The Act has increased the need of tax preparer regulation and has provided
a politically feasible path to its possibility. Given the authority to do so, the
IRS could make significant headway in shrinking the tax gap and increasing
revenue by hundreds of billions of dollars. While its impact on overall
revenue may be the strongest political talking point, it is important to
recognize the impact a lack of regulation will have on individual taxpayers

45.

PURPLE BOOK, supra note 5, at 16.

46. Id.
47. See AICPA Letter to House, supra note 41, at 2 (stating that the IRS does not
already have this authority).

48. Id. at 3.
49. See PURPLE BOOK, supranote 5, at 16 (stating that the support for the legislation
is bipartisan).
50. See Erica Werner & Jeff Stein, In Shift, GOP Eyes More Fundingfor IRS to
Implement New Tax Law, WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/wonk/wp/20 18/01 /1 0/report-irs-to-face-massive-strain-under-gop-taxlaw/?utmterm=.6a6bc4a38269 (expressing support from Republicans to increase

funding to the IRS).
51. See id. (adding that the Republicans may head the advice of the NTA because of
the Act's passage).
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and their trust in the tax system.
Imagine you are a single parent of two children who is counting on a tax
refund to pay the bills or feed your family. You should not be worried that
the IRS is going to ask for that refund back, plus interest, in a few years
because you trusted in a stranger who claimed to have prepared your taxes
correctly.52 If CPAs, attorneys, enrolled preparers, and Volunteer Income
Tax Assistance ("VITA") volunteers are required to demonstrate knowledge
of the tax code and update their training on a regular basis, it is preposterous
that virtually all you need to do to advertise as a professional tax preparer is
to fill out some paperwork.5 3
The IRS needs to have a greater role in the oversight of tax preparers and
should work with Congress, preparers, and taxpayers to create a regulatory
scheme that will help close the tax gap and decrease negative impact on
taxpayers.

52. See 26 U.S.C. § 24(h) (2018) (estimating that claiming even on child incorrectly
for the CTC could result in a taxpayer owing 2,000 dollars to the IRS).
53. See PTIN Application Checklist: What You Need To Get Started, IRS, https:/
/www.irs.gov/tax-professionals/ptin-application-checklist-what-you-need-to-get-started
(last updated Mar. 19, 2018) (listing the following requirements to receive a PTIN).
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